As I considered writing this blog, "Grenfell Tower survivors fear public inquiry whitewash" according to theguardian (Tuesday 04.07.17).
The photos, scrolling above, seek to show the juxtaposition of the 'Social Housing' and 'Private Housing' located in the City of Westminster and Kensington and Chelsea (the richest Borough in London). Some photos are from wider afield.
The tragic fire at Grenfell Tower, has struck a palpable nerve within our whole country, such was the ferocity of the fire, the numbers killed - and importantly, warnings of the possible disaster seemingly ignored.
Pressure groups and angry residents, are understandably looking for accountability, 'someone or persons to pin it on'. They are also very skeptical that the initiated public inquiry will 'deliver' what they want.
With an inquiry which, by necessity, has to be 'limited' in its scope, the leading judge is also rightly concerned that the objectives of the inquiry will not satisfy the aggrieved.
But this tragic fire, has implications and fundamental concerns that are very far reaching, from the manufacture and ‘merchantable quality’ of white goods to the challenge of our entire approach to social divides in a ‘chosen’ capitalist economy.
I hope you will take the trouble to read through this lengthy Blog and read my subsequent updates.
The weightiest finger of suspicion for the rapid spread of the fire - from a construction point of view - has been the installed external rainscreen cladding. This was installed as part of a larger refurbishment project, completed last year. The wider works included a full fenestration make-over of new windows, doors and canopies. Also a completely new wet heating system was installed throughout. This fact has been completely ignored by the media, but its import relates to the former Labour government's own policy to meet a defined 'Decent Home Standard' for social housing.
An overview of all this detail, has helpfully been compiled by Wikipedia:
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grenfell_Tower_fire
The purpose of this blog is to give an 'alternative' picture to the one being given in the mainstream media, but more importantly to consider the wider implications of this tragedy for the building industry, regulation, social housing and our capitalist worldview in particular.
(I'm setting aside the fact that the fire was alleged to have started by a faulty Hotpoint fridge-freezer in a fourth-floor flat - maybe even faulty electrics. The industry associated with 'heat producing' white goods will no doubt be investigating all the aspects relating to the cause of the fire - and preventative measures to curtail any possible ignition and fire spread from domestic appliances in the future).
Before you read on, you might want to consider the following Executive Summary of my initial findings so far. Each will be fully explained and documented going-forward to support my conclusions, well ahead of the public inquiry, which will take a long time yet, even if there is a desire to publish a 'swift' interim analysis and report!
- The installed rainscreen cladding, affixed to the cast-insitu concrete frame, was introduced for three main purposes: a) protection from the elements; b) provision of improved 'thermal comfort' and c) improved aesthetics. It is imperative to grasp the importance of the 'thermal comfort' improvements, as driven by 'Decent Homes' programmes and the social pressure to eliminate 'fuel poverty'.
- The switch that was made from one type of cladding to the final form (at reduced cost) would have made NO DIFFERENCE to the spread of fire in this context. Each type was in the same fire-retardant category. In a process, often referred to as ‘Value Engineering’ it is perfectly rational and acceptable to reduce unnecessary costs (assuming there is no ‘intent’ to diminish, for instance, safety and security).
- Aluminium skinned rainscreen panels, even of the type selected for use, are not intrinsically dangerous - and do not readily combust!
- 'Tests' being carried out by the BRE on hundreds of cladding panel samples (from buildings throughout the UK) are probably deeply flawed! Laboratory conditions are no substitute for insitu-testing!
- Part B (Volume 2) of the Building Regulations, is NOT NECESSARILY unfit, although modifications will be required, even if only to satisfy the thirst for blood!
- It is self-evident that the fire started and proceeded from the inside-out and not 'directly' involving the rainscreen cladding at the initial stage. Initial problems lie elsewhere, including the faulty fridge/freezer and fire stopping to maintain 'compartmentation'.
- Historic fires, in other high-rise blocks of flats, have not led to sufficient or robust scrutiny and improvement of the regulations governing their construction.
- The rapid fire spread was caused by a breach in 'compartmentation' and lack of 'fire-stopping' within the fourth-floor flat (and throughout the block). Once the head, or cill, of the (kitchen?) window reveal was breached, the fire took hold in the insulation and ventilated cavity BEHIND the rainscreen cladding - before engulfing the surface of the tower and becoming unstoppable.
- The 'tea-cosy' effect of the cladding, incorporating a 50mm ventilated cavity behind the rainscreen - with no compartmental fire break - created a 'chimney effect' which 'fuelled' the fire to intense temperatures.
- Victims of the fire most likely died from hot toxic smoke inhalation, well before being physically burned to death, albeit no 'consolation' to the victims or survivors.
- A fire sprinkler system, even if installed throughout the block, is unlikely to have made a difference in this particular case, although may have helped reduce 'smoke logging' in the only central core escape route.
- The only means of escape, via the central core staircase, would have been breached by toxic smoke far too quickly, rendering emergency rescue from ground fire services almost impossible. The victims are likely to have been overcome, by cyanide-impregnated smoke, before being subjected to the horror of the flames.
- The fire safety - "stay-put" - policy was NOT NECESSARILY the wrong policy. With appropriate fire safety planning and contingencies, it is often the ‘best’ plan in high-rise buildings.
- The lack of an integrated, zoned, fully 'addressable' fire alarm system throughout the building was a significant weakness, but there are considerable pros and cons in such a highly technical system.
- The switch to the alternative cladding was probably taken to enhance thermal insulation (above that of the most fire-retardant type), improved aesthetics and reduced cost. It is most unlikely that the ONLY driver was cost reduction ahead of safety considerations.
- Corporate manslaughter charges could lead to injustices to those most exposed to prosecution. These include the leader of the Council, CEO of the Council, CEO of the TMO, CEOs of the principal Contractor, Designer and Installer to mention but a few.... the 'reach' could be far wider!
- Mixed tenure within the Tower, including high numbers of leaseholders, may well have contributed to the 'failure' of the whole refurbishment project, including compromises in specific design and construction.
- The hugely criticised TMO (an arms-length company established by the Council), contrary to media impressions, are not motivated by ‘profit’, taking shortcuts or purposely risking lives. However, in the case of the first two points, Contractors usually are - and the whole approach is governed within a constrained economic environment.
- The design (and eventual installation) of the fenestration and cladding proposals were negligent in as much as the all-important fire breaks and stopping were either fully, or substantially missing. There was a total breach of the principles of fire containment with recognised compartmentation techniques. Consequently, there was a fundamental breach in the 'Duty of Care' owed to the residents by the main parties to the Contract.
- An 'alternative' means of escape was, in my opinion, another serious breach in the duty of care. At that height, even roof-top evacuation should have been an ‘option’ for those trapped in the upper floors.
- The tragedy has also pointed to a total crisis in social housing, albeit that surviving residents should be realistic about temporary alternative housing solutions. There have been many offers, but few takers of alternative accommodation. There needs to be mutual trust and respect of the difficult work in hand to make satisfactory provision in each case.
- Grenfell Tower (and other similar blocks and street properties classified as "social housing" or so called "affordable housing") stands as a palpable monument to the abject failure of social housing policy and delivery. "Social Housing" needs to be clearly defined as to its aims and objectives. Is it 'just' to be a 'safety net' to the less well off - I hesitate to say 'poor'?
- The whole approach to the nation’s provision of 'social housing' has been totally flawed from the beginning - and this is what Grenfell Tower highlights in stark relief.
- The whole housing market (private as well as social), needs to be restructured (however distasteful to some - because of potentially reduced capital receipts) through robust changes in our planning, construction and taxation systems.
- Housing inequality and stigmatisation is rife within every town and village throughout the country. Social division and 'NIMBYISM' needs to be tackled head-on and to a far greater extent, forcing local authorities and developers 'play their part' in delivering the vital 'affordable' housing that is so desperately needed. And until this is done, net immigration to the UK needs to be substantially reduced from current numbers.
- The church needs to wake up, rise up and seize the opportunity to put a massive historic 'wrong', 'right' - when the ‘clergy’ became central to community living and were 'rewarded' handsomely for their work, including substantial residences (e.g. Vicarages) that were vastly 'beyond the reach' of those in the community they were supposed to serve. So, being a member of the clergy became 'attractive' for ALL the wrong reasons. Even the father of Charles Darwin pushed him into training - for life as an idyllic village clergyman, entering Cambridge University for a degree in Theology!
- The calling of the Christian ministry was NEVER about owning assets (although of course modest assets are perfectly acceptable). It was about reaching communities of people with Good News! In the words of Jesus: "The Spirit of the Sovereign LORD is upon me, for the LORD has anointed me to bring good news to the poor. He has sent me to comfort the brokenhearted and to proclaim that captives will be released and prisoners will be freed." Up until recently, the church has singularly failed in that duty - and must SUBSTANTIALLY change to regain ANY credibility with the public. In the most part, the public, understandably, treat the church with disdain, suspicion and irrelevance.
- The church itself should make positive, workable proposals to bridge the gap between the 'haves' and 'have-nots' within our society and rid itself of its impregnable, middle-class image, (offering tangible or practical help to anyone in need), other than 'its own members of the club'.